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1. Introduction 
 
Collusion sustainability in a context of discriminatory prices has received attention by spatial 
economists. By adopting the Hotelling linear city model, Liu and Serfes (2007) and Colombo 
(2010) consider the case of discriminating firms colluding on a uniform price. The rationale 
of  this  scheme  is  based  on  the  difficulty  to  implement  a  collusive  agreement  where  a 
significant number of prices have to be agreed on by the colluding firms. When collusion on 
discriminatory prices is too difficult to implement, firms may coordinate on much simpler 
collusive  schemes,  as  in  uniform  price  collusion.  Examples  of  uniform  price  collusive 
agreements between price discriminating firms are Austrian Banks (D. Comm. June 12, 2002) 
and Specialty Graphite (D. Comm. Dec. 17, 2002). 
1 In this article, we follow Liu and Serfes 
(2007) and Colombo (2010), and we study the conditions for the sustainability of a uniform 
price  agreement  between  price  discriminating  firms.  However,  we  introduce  a  relevant 
generalization:  while  Liu  and  Serfes  (2007)  assume  maximally  differentiated  firms  and 
Colombo (2010) assumes symmetric firms, we allow for any degree of spatial (a)symmetry 
between firms. The motivation is double. First, from casual observations, it is immediate to 
note that firms are usually not symmetrically localized in the space. Some firms are located 
near  to  the  centre  of  the  market,  while  some  others  are  localized  near  to  the  periphery. 
Second, the assumption of symmetric localization is based on the idea that firms choose 
simultaneously where to locate. In this case (provided that firms are equal in any aspects), the 
most likely outcome is a symmetric equilibrium. However, it is far from being obvious that 
firms start to operate at the same time. Some firms may enter the market first, while some 
others may start to operate later. When the assumption of a simultaneous start of firms is 
removed, the assumption of symmetric localisation is no more obvious. In what follows, we 
do not investigate on the endogenous choice of localization when firms enter the market at 
different times, because this goes beyond the aim of the note. Instead, we assume that firms 
are (weakly) asymmetrically localized in the Hotelling market.  
Having  assumed  spatial  asymmetry  between  firms,  we  want  to  answer  the  following 
questions: i) How does firms’ distance affect collusion sustainability, given the degree of 
spatial  symmetry  between  firms?  ii)  how  does  spatial  (a)symmetry  affect  collusion 
sustainability, given the distance between firms?
2 We obtain that, all else being equal, higher 
distance and higher spatial symmetry increases the sustainability of the collusive agreement. 
The rest of this note proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 
3 we study collusion sustainability. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Assume a linear city of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the line. Denote 
by  ] 1   , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each consumer. Each consumer buys no more than one unit of the 
good, and his reservation price is v. There are two firms, A and B. Fixed and marginal costs of 
both firms are constant and normalized to zero. Firm A is located at  d s− , while firm B is 
located  at  d s + .  Then,  firms  are  symmetrically  located  in  the  space  when  2 1 = s .  We 
restrict our attention to the case where firms’ locations are (weakly) asymmetrically distorted 
to the left. That is,  ] 2 1   , 0 ( ∈ s . Parameter s measures the degree of symmetry between firms: 
for given d, the higher is s, the higher is symmetry. Parameter d instead measures the distance 
                                                 
1 See also Colombo (2010) and the discussion therein. 
2 While the first question has been addressed by Chang (1991, 1992), Ross (1992) and Hackner (1995) in a 
uniform price context, and by Gupta and Venkatu (2002) and Colombo (2010) in a price discrimination context, 
the second issue has been unexplored in spatial frameworks.  
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between firms: for given s, the higher is d, the more the firms are distant. Since no firm can 
be located outside the market, it must be:  ]   , 0 ( s d ∈ . Firms pay the transportation costs to ship 
the good from the plant to the consumers’ location. We assume linear transportation costs. 
Therefore, to ship one unit of the product from plant  d s−  (resp.  d s + ) to consumer x, firm 
A (resp. B) pays a transport cost equal to:  d s x t + −  (resp.  d s x t − − ), where t is the (strictly 
positive) unit transport cost. We also assume that the reservation price is sufficiently high, so 
that the market is always covered in equilibrium. In particular:  t v 2 ≥ . Finally, let  ) (x pJ  
denote the price schedule charged by firm  B A J , = . We define a price schedule as follows: it 
refers to a positive valued function  (.) J p , with  B A J , = ,  defined on  ] 1   , 0 [  that specifies the 
price  ) (x pJ  at which firm J is willing to sell one unit to consumer x.  
Suppose  that  firms  interact  repeatedly  in  an  infinite  horizon  setting.  In  supporting 
collusion, the firms may revert to competitive prices forever if a deviation occurs (grim-
trigger punishment mechanism) or may adopt an optimal punishment scheme. Denote by 
C
J Π , 
D
J Π  and 
P
J Π  respectively the one shot collusive, deviation and punishment profits of 
firm  B A J , = , and with δ  the market discount factor. Collusion is sustainable as a sub game 
perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if the discounted value of the profits that each firm 
obtains under collusion exceeds the discounted value of the profits that each firm obtains 
when deviates from the agreement. This amounts to require that the following incentive 
compatibility constraint has to be satisfied:  
 














t δ δ , with  B A J , =                                 (1) 
 
After rearranging, the incentive compatibility constraints can be written as:  
 








J Π − Π
Π − Π
≡ δ , with  B A J , =                                           (2) 
 
Therefore,  collusion  is  sustainable  as  a  sub game  perfect  equilibrium  if  and  only  if: 
] , max[ B A δ δ δ ≥ . In other words,  ] , max[ B A δ δ  (“the critical discount factor”) measures cartel 





We denote by 
N
J p  and 
N
J Π  respectively the equilibrium price schedule and the equilibrium 
profits of firm  B A J , =  when firms compete. While under collusion the firms charge uniform 
price, during the punishment stage they are free to use discriminatory prices. The following 
proposition defines the equilibrium competitive prices: 
 
Proposition 1: when the firms compete, the equilibrium price schedules are: 
 
                                                   ] , max[ ) ( d s x d s x x p
N − − + − =                                      (3) 
                
Proof.  See Theorem 1 in Lederer and Hurter (1986).                                                               ■                         
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The  intuition  of  Proposition  1  is  straightforward.  For  a  given  location  x,  Bertrand 
competition  drives  prices  down  to  the  level  of the  larger  transportation  costs,  say  i x− , 
where  i  is  the  location  of  the  farthest  firm.
3  Assuming  that  in  case  of  equal  prices  each 
consumer buys from the nearer firm, the Nash profits of the two firms are:  
 
                                       ) 2 ( ) ) ( (




A − = + − − = Π ∫                                   (4) 
 
                                     ) 2 2 ( ) ) ( (
1





B − − = − − − = Π ∫                                (5) 
 
In  case  of  a  grim-trigger  punishment,  the  Nash  profits  coincide  with  the  punishment 
profits. On the other hand, in case of optimal punishment, we state a result due to Espinosa 
(1992) which characterizes the equilibrium deviator’s profits in case of optimal punishment: 
 
Proposition 2: a credible punishment that minimizes the deviator’s profits exists for any 
discount factor, and entails zero profits for the deviating firm (Espinosa, 1992). 
 
The intuition of Proposition 2 is the following. We look for the mostly severe punishment. 
This occurs when the punishing firm, in case of a deviation of the other firm, starts a basing 
point pricing where the location of the deviating firm serves as a base point. In this case the 
profits of the deviating firm are no larger than zero, whatever is the price schedule adopted by 
the  deviating  firm.  Therefore,  multiple  price  schedules  equilibria  exist,  but  they  are  all 
characterized by the fact that the deviating firm gets zero profits.
4 That is:  0 = Π
P . 
 
Next, we consider the collusive stage. We follow Hackner (1994) and we assume that 
firms collude on the uniform price which maximizes joint profits. Therefore, the firms set the 
uniform price in such a way to extract the whole consumer surplus. As the reservation price is 
v, the perfect collusive price is:  v p
C = * . The collusive profits are:  
 
                                 )]
2





d t vs dx d s x t p
s C C
A − + − = + − − = Π ∫                              (6) 
 





B dx d s x t p ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 [
2
) 1 (
2 2 s s d d
t
s v − + − − − − =               (7) 
 
Suppose that firm A deviates. It undercuts firm B at the collusive price  *
C p  and obtains 
the whole market. Therefore, the deviation profits of firm A are:  
 
                                                 
3 In case of positive marginal production costs, the equilibrium price at each location x would be represented by 
the maximum total (i.e. production plus transportation) marginal cost. 
4 The optimal punishment indicated in Proposition 2 implicitly excludes that some consumers closer to the 
deviating firm decides to purchase from the punishing firm instead than from the deviating firm (“consumers’ 
deviation”). If this is possible, the basing point strategy at the punishment stage may be risky for the punisher. 
In fact, the punishing firm may be damaged when it sets a below cost price if some consumers buy from it. I 
thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
2417Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2414-2421
  4 
                         ∫ + − − = Π
1
0 ] * [ dx d s x t p
C D




2 2 s d s s d t v − + + − + − =                    (8) 
 
Similarly, if firm B deviates, it undercuts firm A at the collusive price  *
C p  and obtains 
the whole market. Its deviation profits are:  
 
                            = − − − = Π ∫
1
0 ] * [ dx d s x t p
C D




2 2 s d s s d t v − − + − + −                    (9) 
 
Inserting the collusive profits, the punishment profits and the deviation profits into the 
discount factor and after simplifying, we have:  
 
                                                   
) 2 2 2 1 ( 2
)] 2 1 ( 2 )[ 1 (
2 s s d t v
s d t v s gt
A + − + −
− + − −
= δ                                            (10) 
 
                                                
] 2 2 2 1 [ 2
)] 2 ( 2 [
2 s s d t v
d s t v s gt
B + − + −
+ −
= δ                                           (11) 
 
in the case of grim-trigger punishment, and  
 
                                       
] 2 2 ) 2 1 ( 2 2 1 [ 2
)] 2 1 ( 2 )[ 1 (
2 2 s s s d d t v
s d t v s op
A + − − + + −
− + − −
= δ                                (12) 
 
                                       
] 2 2 ) 2 1 ( 2 2 1 [ 2
)] 2 ( 2 [
2 2 s s s d d t v
d s t v s op
B + − − − + −
+ −
= δ                                (13) 
 










A δ δ ≥ . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.                                                                                                           ■ 
 
The discount factor of firm A is higher than the discount factor of firm B, both in the case 
of grim-trigger and optimal punishment. Hence, the critical discount factor is 
gt
A δ  and 
op
A δ . 
Therefore, the firm with the greatest incentive to deviate is the firm with the worst location in 
the  space.  The  intuition  is  the  following.  Recall  that  the  discount  factor  of  each  firm 
decreases with the collusive profits (i.e. collusion is easier to sustain), while it increases with 
the deviation profits and the punishment profits (i.e. collusion is more difficult to sustain). As 
firm B is better positioned in the space than firm A, it has a natural advantage over firm A. 
Therefore, the collusive profits, the deviation profits and the Nash profits of firm B are higher 
than the correspondent profits of firm A. In the linear city model, the dominant effect is 
linked to the collusive profits: as firm A has lower collusive profits with respect to firm B, it 
is more prompt to deviate from the agreement than firm B. 
 
The  impact  of  symmetry  and  distance  on  collusion  sustainability  is  described  in  the 
following proposition: 
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Proposition  4.  Greater  symmetry  and  greater  firms’  distance  lower  the  critical  discount 
factor. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.                                                                                                           ■                        
 
Therefore, when any degree of spatial symmetry/asymmetry between firms is allowed, the 
relationship between firms’ distance and collusion sustainability is positive. Similarly, the 
relationship  between  firms’  symmetry  and  collusion  sustainability,  given  the  distance 
between firms, is positive. The intuition of Proposition 4 is the following. Consider first the 
effect of greater distance between firms. The punishment profits (in the case of the grim-
trigger  punishment)  increase  with  d,  as  lower  distance  between  firms  implies  less  fierce 
competition during the non cooperative stage. The deviation profits decrease with d. This is 
due to the fact that when the distance increases, each consumer is more “loyal” to the nearer 
firm, and it is more difficult for the cheating firm to steal consumers from the rival. Instead, 
the effect of d on the collusive profits is not monotonic and it can be positive or negative. In 
particular,  as  long  as  d  approximates  to  2 s ,  collusive  profits  increase  with  d,  and  then 
decrease,  as  2 s d =   allows  firm  A  to  minimize  the  transportation  costs  within  its  own 
market. The effect of d on the deviation profits is the dominant effect, whatever is the sign of 
the relationship between the firms’ distance and the collusive profits. This determines the 
positive relationship between firms’ distance and collusion sustainability. Consider now the 
impact of higher spatial symmetry on the sustainability of the collusive agreement. Higher s 
increases the punishment profits of firm A (in the case of the grim-trigger punishment), as it 
serves more consumers in equilibrium (recall that in equilibrium each firm serves only the 
nearer consumers). Higher s increases also the collusive profits, as the market area served by 
firm A is larger. The deviation profits increase with s too. In fact, during deviation, firm A 
keeps the collusive profits on locations  s x ≤ : as s increases, collusive profits increase, thus 
determining also higher deviation profits. The positive effect of more spatial symmetry on the 
collusive profits outweighs the increase of the punishment and the deviation profits, thus 
allowing for less stringent conditions on the market discount factor for the sustainability of 




A  consistent  number  of  studies,  both  in  regional  economics  and  industrial  organization 
theory,  analyse  the  impact  of  firms’  locations  on  the  sustainability  of  collusion  in 
equilibrium.
5  As  the  location  of  firms  can  be  easily  observed,  antitrust  regulators  should 
consider firms’ localization as a relevant variable when assessing the likelihood of collusive 
behaviours  by  firms.  This  approach  seems  well  established  in  U.S.  antitrust,  as  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Justice’s  Merger  Guidelines  (1984)  explicitly  suggest  considering  spatial 
localization of firms when analysing potential collusive phenomena. 
In this note we study the case of price discriminating firms which collude on a uniform 
price within the context of the linear city model. We depart from literature by imposing no 
restriction on firms’ location. That is, we allow the firms to be asymmetrically located in the 
space. In this way we are able to consider the impact of firms’ distance on the sustainability 
of the collusive agreement in equilibrium maintaining as general as possible the degree of 
spatial (a)symmetry between firms. Similarly, we are able to analyse the impact of firms’ 
spatial symmetry on collusion sustainability for any possible distance between firms. First, 
we obtain that the firm with the worst location in the space has always the greatest incentive 
                                                 
5 See Colombo (2011) for a survey of the most relevant contributions in this area. 
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to deviate. Therefore, to asses the impact of spatial (a)symmetry and distance between firms 
on collusion sustainability, it is sufficient to consider the impact of these variables on the 
discount  factor  of  the  firm  with  the  worst  location.  We  obtain  that  both  higher  spatial 
symmetry  and  greater  distance  between  firms  lower  the  discount  factor,  thus  making 
collusion easier to be sustained in equilibrium, both in the case of grim-trigger punishment 
and optimal punishment. This is due to the fact that higher distance between firms decreases 
the additional gains from deviation of the worst located firm, thus making collusion easier to 
be  sustained  in  equilibrium.  On  the  other  hand,  higher  spatial  symmetry  between  firms 
increases the collusive profits of the worst located firm, thus reducing its incentive to deviate 




Proof of Proposition 3. The denominators of 
gt
A δ  and 
gt
B δ  are equal. Taking the difference 
between the numerator of 
gt
A δ  and the numerator of 
gt
B δ  we get:  ) 2 2 )( 2 1 ( td t v s − − − , which 
is always non negative, given the assumptions on v, t, s and d. Consider now 
op
A δ  and 
op
B δ . 
The denominator of 
op
A δ  is lower than the denominator of 
op
B δ . As the numerators of 
op
A δ  
(resp.
op
B δ ) and 
gt
A δ  (resp.
gt
B δ ) are equal, it follows that 
op
A δ  is larger than 
op
B δ .                      ■                                                                                       
 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the derivative of 
gt
A δ  with respect to s: 
 
             
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
)] 2 2 2 1 ( 2 [
] 2 2 4 2 [ )] ( ) 2 2 ( 2 [
2
s s d t v




+ − + −




      (14) 
 
In order to prove that  0 < ∂ ∂ s
gt
A δ , we need to show that the numerator is positive. First, note 
that the first term in the numerator is always positive. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that 
the second term is non negative. Consider the second term. The derivative of the second term 
with respect to s is:  0 ) 2 1 ( 2 < − − s t . Therefore, the second term takes the highest value when 
0 = s . In this case, the second term becomes:  t td v − −4 2 , which is always positive since 
2 1 ≤ d  and  t v 2 ≥ . Consider the derivative of 
gt
A δ  with respect to d, which is:  
 
                                                0
)] 2 2 2 1 ( 2 [









s s d t v




                               (15) 
 
 as  2 1 ≤ s . Consider now the derivative of 
op
A δ  with respect to s:  
 
                          
2 2 2
2 2 2 3
)] 2 2 4 2 2 1 ( 2 [
)] )( 2 ( ) ( 2 ) 1 2 ( 2 [
2
s s ds d d t v




+ − − + + −




             (16) 
 
In order to prove that  0 < ∂ ∂ s
op
A δ , we need to show that the numerator is positive. By taking 
the derivative of the numerator with respect to d, we get:  0 ] 4 ) 4 2 1 6 ( [
2 < − − + − vd sd s d t t . 
Therefore,  the  numerator  takes  the  lowest  value  when  s d = .  By  substituting  into  the 
numerator, we get:  0 ) 2 1 ( 2
2 2 2 > − − + s vt v s t . Therefore, the numerator is always positive. 
Finally, let us consider the derivative of 
op
A δ  with respect to d, which is:  
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                                   0
)] 2 2 4 2 2 1 ( 2 [





+ − − + + −




s s ds d d t v
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